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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Veronica Lynn Calver is the mother of RC. and, as such, has a recognized
fundamental right to parent RC. Raymond Calver, RC.'s father, filed for divorce two
days prior to Veronica Calver moving to Tennessee with R.C. and Ms. Calver's two
older children (neither the natural or adoptive children of Raymond). An Ada County
magistrate issued a pro forma Joint Temporary Restraining Order (hereinafter JTRO)
upon the divorce filing, prohibiting either Raymond or Veronica from "removing" RC.
from the State of Idaho for periods exceeding 72 hours.

Ms. Calver was arrested in

Tennessee and, rather than being charged with contempt of court for allegedly violating
the JTRO, she was charged with custodial interference and was later convicted.
The Information filed in this case alleged that Ms. Calver, "without lawful
authority," interfered with Raymond Calver's custodial rights which arose from the
JTRO, by "tak[ing] and/or keep[ing] and/or withhold[ing]" RC. from Mr. Calver.
However, the JTRO did not actually bar Ms. Calver from taking, keeping, or withholding
RC. from Raymond Calver. At most, it required Ms. Calver to keep RC. somewhere in
the State of Idaho except for periods not exceeding 72 hours, but failure to do so did not
result in interference with any custodial right enjoyed by Mr. Calver. As the State failed
to prove that Ms. Calver was "without lawful authority" to take, keep, or withhold RC.
from Mr. Calver as charged in the Information, the State failed to provide sufficient
evidence to support Ms. Calver's conviction for custodial interference.

As such,

Ms. Calver's conviction must be vacated and a judgment of acquittal must be entered.
Alternatively, if this Court finds the JTRO established Raymond Calver had a
custodial or parental right to have R.e. somewhere in the State of Idaho, the jury
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instructions failed to require the jury to find a violation of this specific right. The jury was
instructed that they must convict Veronica Calver if they found she took, kept, or
withheld R.C. from Raymond Calver, conduct which Ms. Calver had the lawful authority
to engage in.

As such, the jury instructions were erroneous and the error was not

harmless, requiring this Court to vacate Ms. Calver's conviction and remand the case
for a new trial.
Finally, the jury instructions contained a fatal variance as they instructed the jury
that a person's "right to custody" may arise either from a specific custody order, the
allegation made in the Information, or from "the equal custodial rights of each parent in
the absence of a custody order," an allegation not made in the Information. Because
the jury instructions allowed the jury to convict Ms. Calver on a charge not made,
Ms. Calver's conviction must be vacated and her case remanded for a new trial
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Raymond and Veronica Lynn Calver (a.k.a. Lynn Haney) 1 , were married in Las
Vegas, Nevada, in December of 2005, and their son, R.C., was born in December of
200S. (Tr.12/20/11, p.S, L.20 - p.12, L.3; p.146, L.S - p.149, L.14.) Mr. Calver was
using methamphetamine and struggling to maintain steady employment when the two
decided to move to Idaho with R.C., and Ms. Calver's son, J.M, and daughter, D.M., in
April of 2009. (Tr.12/20/11, p.31, L.3 - p.32, L.1S; p.149, L.15 - p.156, L.7.) Over the
course of the next fourteen months, police investigated multiple domestic violence
incidents allegedly perpetrated by Raymond Calver upon Ms. Calver, and one incident

1 Ms.
Calver goes by her middle name, Lynn, and her maiden name, Haney.
(Tr.2/20/11, p.10, Ls.7-17.) However, in order to be consistent with this appeal's case
heading, she will be referred to as Veronica Calver or Ms. Calver in this Appellant's

Brief.
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involving Mr. Calver and a thirteen-year-old J.M. (Tr.12/20/11, p.14, L.16 - p.18, L.14;
p.54, L.5 - p.55, L.10l During the Fourth of July weekend in 2011, the Calver family
went camping at Grimes Creek; and Mr. Calver allegedly dared J.M. to cross a raging
creek, J.M. lost his footing and was struggling in the water, but Mr. Calver stood by and
did not do anything to help while a family friend, Kurt Harding, assisted J.M.
(Tr.2/20/12, p.115, L.1 - p.117, L.23; p.119, Ls.14-15; p.167, L.15 - p.171, L.2l This
incident was the last straw for Ms. Calver who kicked Raymond out of the house, and
he went to live with his mother a few blocks away. (Tr.2/20/12. p.26, L.17 - p.28, L.9;
p.175, L.i0 - p.176, L.12.) Ms. Calver, however, did not attempt to stop Mr. Calver
from seeing R.C., and he did so intermittently. (Tr.2/20/12, p.33, L.22 - p.34, L.11.)
Even prior to this incident, the Calvers had discussed moving to Tennessee to
start over and live in a house right next door to Ms. Calver's mother. (Tr.2/20/12, p.35,
L.7 - p.36, L.10; p.177, L.23 - p.186, L.19.) Although Mr. Calver testified he decided
not to move to Tennessee after their separation, Ms. Calver testified he had agreed to
at least drive them out to Tennessee; It was her hoped that he would stay and deal with
his methamphetamine problem and become the man that she fell in love with. The two
had worked toward getting their vehicle ready for the trip and had even planned the
route, but Mr. Calver backed out a few days prior to the planned departure date. Id.
On August 29, 2011, Raymond Calver filed a Complaint for Divorce. (Exh. 1.)
An Ada County Magistrate immediately issued a JTRO (Children), which appears to be

Similar incidents occurred in Las Vegas, one of which resulted in Mr. Calver's arrest.
(Tr.2/20/12, p.18, L.15 - p.19, L.24.)

2

3 Raymond Calver denied encouraging J.M. to attempt crossing the creek and testified
that he told him that it would not be a good idea, but he admitted that he did not try and
assist J.M., believing him to be a "very good swimmer." (Tr.2/20/12, p.20, L.19 - p.23,

L 16.)
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automatically issued upon the filing of a divorce complaint. 4 (Exh. A.) The next day,
Forrest Calver, Raymond's brother, signed an affidavit claiming that he "served"
Veronica Calver with multiple documents related to the divorce filing, including the
JTRO. (Exh. 2.) Forrest Calver claims he gave Ms. Calver the documents, that she
reviewed them in his presence, and said she would destroy both him and Raymond
Calver.

(Tr.2/19/12, p.138, L.21 - p.139, L.7; p.147, L.9 - p.152, L.16.) On cross-

examination, however, Forrest Calver testified he did not recall what was actually in the
paperwork he handed to Ms. Calver, and he was not sure whether the JTRO was
included. (Tr.2/19/12, p.154, L.12 - p.156, L.9.) Ms. Calver testified Forrest came to
her house, dropped the papers at her feet and told her she had been served, but she
did not read the papers and was told the service was improper. 5 (Tr.2/20/12, p.188,
L.13-p.194, L.18,)
Ms. Calver packed herself, J.M., D.M., and R.C., and their belongings and
started for Tennessee on either September 1 or September 3, 2011.6

(Tr.2/20/12,

The JTRO was filed at 10:51a.m., while the Complaint for Divorce contains a hand
written notation that it was filed at 10:57a.m. (Compare Exh. 1 with Exh. A.) The JTRO
contains nothing specifically related to the Calvers other than their names in the
heading. Furthermore, the JTRO explains "The judges of the domestic relations court of
Ada County are of the opinion that all parties ought to be subject to a joint restraining
order from the date of the institution of the proceeding or service of process in order to
maintain the status quo in their relationships with their children," indicating that the
Magistrate who signed the order did so as a matter of course. (Exh. 1.)
4

Tammy Derose, the manager of the apartments rented by the Calvers, testified she
was present when Forrest allegedly served Veronica and, although she was not allowed
to testify to the content of her conversation with Veronica due to a hearsay objection,
she testified she concluded Veronica had not been legally served with the divorce
papers. (Tr.2/20/12, p.131, L.23-p.133, L.5; p.136, L.24-p.137, L.20.)
5

6 Ms. Calver testified that she left on September 1st . (Tr.2/20/12, p.198, Ls.14-25.)
However, when speaking to a police officer on September 5th , she claimed that's she
left Idaho two days prior. (Tr.2/19/12, p.129, L.2 - p.130, L.3; See also Exh. 3.)
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p.198, Ls.14-2S.) However, her car broke down beyond repair near Tremonton, Utah,
due to oil in the transmission,? and Ms. Calver was taken to a hospital due to an anxiety
attack. (Tr.2/20/12, p.199, L.5 - p.203, L.4.) The family then spent a few nights in a
hotel room before finally staying in a shelter in Brigham City, Utah, after Ms. Calver had
run out of money. (Tr.2/20/12, p.201, L.15 - p.205, L.21.)
On September 5th , Garden City Police officer Kristopher Olsen contacted
Ms. Calver's mother looking for Ms. Calver, and shortly therafter, he after received a call
from Ms. Calver.

(Tr.2/19/12, p.124, L.1 - p.125, L.S.) During their recorded phone

conversation, Officer Olsen read Ms. Calver the specific clause in the JTRO which
stated she could not remove a child from Idaho for more than 72 hours.

(Exh. 3.)

Ms. Calver explained she was not previously aware of the JTRO and had not been
properly served with the divorce papers; she also told Officer Olsen about Mr. Calver's
violent tendencies and drug use. (Id.) Officer Olsen stated the order required her to
return R.e. to the State of Idaho, not necessarily Raymond. (Id.) Ms. Calver stated she
would speak with an attorney and ended the phone call. (Id.) A couple of days later,
Ms. Calver spoke with Detective John Brumbaugh of the Garden City Police
Department, who faxed a copy of the JTRO to her at the shelter where she was staying,
and threatened to seek a felony warrant if she did not immediately return R.C. to the
State of Idaho. (Tr.2/20/12, p.S5, L.6 - p.93, L.6; Exh. 4.)

? Veronica testified her daughter, D.M., told her that when Raymond was topping off the
fluids in the truck in anticipation of the long drive, he put oil in transmission. (Tr.2/20/12,
p.200, Ls.4-21.) Ms. Calver did not believe D.M. because she is known to "tell stories
and stuff" due to her Asberger's and ADHD. (Tr.2/21/12, p.147, Ls.13-23; p.200, Ls.421.) When confronted, Ms. Calver claimed Raymond neither admitted nor denied
putting oil in the transmission - "He just kind of laughed a little bit." (Tr.2/20/12, p.203,
Ls.7-14.)

5

Ms Calver's mother and step-father drove from Tennessee to Utah, picked up
Ms. Calver and her children and took them to Tennessee, where Ms. Calver
immediately enrolled the children in school and got them set up with care for their
special needs. 8

(Tr.2/20/12, p.209, L.11 - p.212, L.5.)

Ms. Calver spoke with an

attorney in Tennessee who told her the restraining order was not valid, she showed the
papers faxed to her by Detective Brumbaugh to local law enforcement officers, and she
enrolled in parenting classes.

(Tr.2/20/12, p.214, L.2 - p.216, L.13.) Ten days after

arriving in Tennessee, Ms. Calver was arrested on an Idaho warrant.

(Tr.2/20/12,

p.214, L.2 - p.220, L.22.)
Ms. Calver raised as an affirmative defense at trial that her actions were
necessary to protect either herself or her children from imminent physical harm as
provided by I.C. § 18-4506, and the jury was further instructed on the defense of
necessity. (Tr.2/20/12, p.146, L.8 - p.289, L.12; R., pp.80-81.) No objection was made
to the jury instructions as given.
Ms. Calver guilty.

(Tr.2/20/12, p.253, Ls.3-19.)

(R., p.67; Tr.2/20/12, p.291, L.7 - p.294, L.21.)

The jury found
Ms Calver was

sentenced to a unified term of five years, with one year fixed, suspended, and she was
placed on probation for a period of five years. (R., pp.91-97.) Ms. Calver filed a timely
Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.98-100.)

8

In addition to D.M.'s needs, R.C. had a kidney removed, which required on-going

medical care. (Tr.2/20/12, p.37, Ls.3-7; p.211, L.1-p.212, L.5.)

6

ISSUES
1

Should this Court vacate Ms. Calver's conviction for custodial interference as the
State failed to provide sufficient evidence that Ms. Calver was "without lawful
authority" to take, keep or withhold R.C. from Mr. Calver?

2.

Was Ms. Calver's right to due process of law violated by the district court
erroneously instructing the jury that Ms. Calver could be convicted of child
custody interference on the findings of facts necessary to support a guilty
verdict?

3.

Does there exist a fatal variance between the Information and the jury
instructions, as the jury instructions advised that Mr. Calver's custodial rights
could arise either from a custodial order, as alleged in the Information, or from his
equal custodial right as a parent, which was not alleged in the Information?

7

ARGUMENT
I.
This Court Should Vacate Ms. Calver's Conviction For Custodial Interference As The
State Failed To Provide Sufficient Evidence Ms. Calver Was "Without Lawful Authority"
To Take, Keep Or Withhold R.C. From Mr. Calver
A.

Introduction
A person cannot be found guilty of custodial interference unless the state proves,

beyond a reasonable doubt, the person did not have the "lawful authority" to "interfere"
with another's custodial rights.

Natural parents have lawful authority over their own

children and this authority cannot generally be abridged by governmental action unless
the state shows a compelling interest requiring intervention.
between parents do not justify governmental interference.

Mere disagreements
The only limitation on

Ms. Calver's right to parent in this case was the JTRO issued by a magistrate court
when Mr. Calver filed for divorce. As such, the State could not convict Ms. Calver of
custodial interference absent proof both that she violated the specific terms of JTRO,
and that the JTRO granted Mr. Calver the very custodial rights Ms. Calver was alleged
to have interfered with.

The State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support

Ms. Calver's conviction.
B.

The State Failed To Provide Sufficient Evidence To Support Ms. Calver's
Conviction
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the State

of Idaho from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." U.S. Const. Amd. XIV. "Just as 'Conviction upon a charge not made would be
sheer denial of due process,' so is it a violation of due process to convict and punish a
man without evidence of his guilt." Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206
(1960) (quoting De Jonge v. State of Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937) (additional

8

citations omitted).) "It is axiomatic that a conviction upon a charge not made or upon a
charge not tried constitutes a denial of due process." Jackson v. Virginia, 433 U.S. 307,
314 (1979) (citations omitted).
The sufficiency of the evidence presented to sustain a conviction can be raised
for the first time on appeal. State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877-78 (1995). "Appellate
review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A finding of guilt will not be
overturned on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier
of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the
essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Warburton, 145
Idaho 760,761-62 (Ct. App. 2008).
The State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that
Ms. Calver committed custodial interference.
1.

The J.T.R.O. Is The Only Limit On Ms. Calver's Lawful Authority Over The
Custody, Care And Nurturing Of R.C.

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the right of parents to
make decisions about how to best raise their children is a "liberty interest," or
"substantive due process" right, protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510

(1925).

"[T]he custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose

primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citing Pierce,
268 U.S. at 510.)

Although the rights of parents are not unlimited (see id.), the

government may not infringe on the rights of parents unless the infringement is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
(1993).

9

Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02

Ms. Calver, as RC.'s mother, has the constitutionally protected "lawful authority,"
as well as the responsibility, to make decisions regarding the custody, care, and
nurturing of RC. No governmental official has the power to invade this substantive due
process right without showing a compelling state interest, and any laws passed or
judicial orders filed

must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest.

Mere

disagreements between two parents about the custody, care, and nurturing of their
child(ren) do not automatically create a compelling state interest justifying government
intervention, no matter how narrowly tailored such intervention may be.

Indeed, a

judge's decision as to what is in the "best interest of the child," is not sufficient in and of
itself to undermine parental choice on the same matter. See Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57 (2000). A lawfully entered custodial order can limit a parent's substantive due
process right to parent. Assuming the validity of the JTRO issued automatically by the
magistrate upon Mr. Calver filing a petition for divorce,9 this judicial order places the

9 Under Idaho law, "[I]n an action for divorce the court may, before and after judgment,
give such direction for the custody, care and education of the children of the marriage
as may seem necessary or proper in the best interests of the children." I.C. § 32-717.
The JTRO in this case was entered "in order to maintain the status quo" in the parties'
relationship with their children, without any consideration of the "best interests" of RC.
(Exh. 1.) On its face, the order violates I.C. § 32-717. Furthermore, because the order
interferes with the parties' fundamental right to parent, Ms. Calver asserts she has a
procedural due process right to a custody hearing before the court has the authority to
limit her substantive due process right to parent. The United States Supreme Court
struck down an Illinois law which presumed an unwed natural father is unfit to parent,
and which automatically made children wards of the State upon the death of the mother,
holding that an unwed father has a right to hearing before any such decision can be
made. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). In rejecting Illinois' argument that a
father might be able to get his custody rights back through guardian or adoption
proceedings, the Court stated, "This Court has not, however, embraced the general
proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be undone." Id. at 647. The validity of
the JTRO was not challenged in the district court proceedings and was entered as an
exhibit without objection; thus, its validity is not challenged in this appeal.
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only limit on Ms. Calver's lawful authority to take R.C. with her to start a new life in
Tennessee.
2.

The Joint Temporary Restraining Order Did Not Establish A Specific
Custodial Right Prohibiting Ms. Calver From Taking, Keeping, Or
Withholding R.C. From Mr. Calver

The specific provision of the JTRO allegedly violated by Ms. Calver reads as
follows:
Therefore, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 65(g), the Plaintiff and Defendant are
prohibited from doing the following acts during the pendency of this action
without specific written consent of the parties or prior Order of the court:
1 Removing any minor child of the parties who reside in Idaho from the
State of Idaho (except for periods of time not exceeding 72 hours).
(Exh,

1.)10

The JTRO further states it is binding upon the parties or their agents "who

receive actual notice of this order by personal service or otherwise." Id. By its plain
language, the JTRO states that neither Ms, Calver nor Raymond may "remove" R.C.
from Idaho for more than 72 hours, absent permission from the other parent or the
Court. The JTRO does not require R.C. to be returned to Idaho if he has already been
"removed" at the time the order is served. Furthermore, the JTRO does not establish
any custodial rights for either party. It does not establish who R.C. should live with and
how much time each parent will be allowed to spend with him. Importantly, the JTRO
does not prohibit Ms, Calver from taking, keeping, or withholding R.C. from Mr. Calver.
At best, the JTRO establishes a requirement that R.C. be somewhere in the State of
Idaho for periods not to exceed 72 hours, but does not establish where in Idaho R.C.
must be.

Notably, the JTRO warned of possible penalties "including a fine of up to $5000, up to
five days in jail, an award of costs and attorney fees against you, and such other
sanctions as the court may deem appropriate." (Exh. 1.) No warning was given that a
10

violation may result in felony charges.
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Regardless of whether the Magistrate intended to establish custodial rights
beyond what is contained in the JTRO, the Magistrate's purported intent is irrelevant. In

State v. Rice, 145 Idaho 554 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the district
court's finding that an attorney was in contempt of court for failing to abide by a court
order. During a criminal trial, an issue arose over the disclosure of a potential defense
witness. Id. at 555. The district court entered the following order:
[T]he court orders that the defense must either make its expert available
for interview by the state as to his anticipated testimony or opinions or
defense counsel may provide to the state a written summary of the
substance of the testimony of the witness. Such a summary must be
adequate to allow the state to be aware of the basis of the expert's
opinion. Failure to provide such an adequate summary or to allow the
interview of the witness will result in the court continuing the trial after the
expert renders his opinion to allow the state at least two days time to
prepare for cross-examination and financial sanctions to reimburse the
state for any costs incurred in delaying the trial.
Id. (emphasis in the original). The next morning, defense counsel informed the district

court that she had not provided any additional information to the State regarding the
potential witness. Id. The district court summarily found defense counsel in contempt
of court but later held a hearing allowing defense counsel to explain her decision. Id.
Defense counsel explained she believed the order provided the option of either
providing a summary or to make the witness available for an interview with the State, or
if neither of those of those things occurred and the witness was called, the trial would be
continued for two days with defense counsel responsible to reimburse the State for any
costs incurred in delaying the trial. Id. The district court rejected this explanation and
found counsel in contempt. Id. at 555-56. The witness was never called. Id. at 556.
The Supreme Court vacated the contempt order finding that defense counsel did
not willfully violate the court's order. Id. The Court interpreted the district court's order
as providing four options: 1) Defense counsel could elect not to call the witness; 2)
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defense counsel could supply the State with a summary; 3) defense counsel could
make the witness available to the State for an interview; or 4) defense counsel could
delay the decision and pay the costs incurred if she chose to call the witness. Id. As
defense counsel chose the fourth option, she did not violate the court order and could
not be found in contempt. Id.

Notably, the Court rejected the State's argument that,

"the district court did not intend to make the trial delay with payment of the cost of the
delay an available option, but rather that provision of the order was a penalty or
sanction for failure to make the witness available for interview or to provide a summary
of testimony."

Id.

The Court found the State's interpretation was a "possible"

interpretation but that defense counsel's interpretation was "reasonable," and "[t]o find a
person in criminal contempt for willfully disobeying a court order, the order must be clear
and unequivocaL" Id. (citations omitted).
Thus, regardless of whether the Magistrate "intended" the JTRO to prevent
Ms. Calver from taking, keeping or withholding R.C. from Mr. Calver, the JTRO simply
does not state so.

As the JTRO was the only limitation placed on Ms. Calver's

substantive due process right to parent, any other possible intended limitation is
irrelevant and cannot be a basis to sustain Ms. Calver's conviction.
3.

The State Failed To Provide Sufficient Evidence Ms. Calver Engaged In
Behavior That She Lacked Lawful Authority To Engage In And That She
Violated A Custodial Right Enjoyed By Mr. Calver

The custodial interference statute Ms. Calver was charged with violating reads, in
relevant part, as follows:
1. A person commits child custody interference if the person, whether a
parent or other, or agent of that person, intentionally and without lawful
authority:
(a) Takes, entices away, keeps or withholds any minor child from a parent
or another person or institution having custody, joint custody, visitation or
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other parental rights, whether such rights arise from temporary or
permanent custody order, or from the equal custodial rights of each
parent in the absence of a custody order .....
I.C. § 18-4506(1 )(a) (emphasis added). Violation of this statute requires more than just
showing a person "takes, entices away, keeps or withholds any minor child from a
parent," etc; the State must also prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the person who did
the taking, enticing away, keeping, or withholding, was without the lawful authority to do
so.
Furthermore, although the statute purports to establish that custodial rights may
arise either from a temporary custodial order or from "the equal custodial rights of each
parent in the absence of a custody order,,,11 Ms. Calver was only alleged to have
violated the custodial rights granted to Mr. Calver through the JTRO. The Information in
this case reads as follows:
That the Defendant, VERONICA L CALVER AKA HANEY, on or
between the 8th day of September, 2011 and the 10th day of October,
2011, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did intentionally and without
lawful authority, take and/or keep and/or withhold, a minor child, R. C., a
child of the age of two (2), from Raymond Calver and who has joint
custody and/or other parental rights arising from temporary
11 The jury instructions erroneously allowed the jury to find Mr. Calver's custodial rights
arose either from the JTRO or from his "equal custodial rights" as R.C.'s father, which is
a variance addressed in section III of this brief below. However, to the extent the
statute could be applied in such a way that one parent could be held criminally liable for
taking, keeping, or withholding a child from the other parent, absent a court order, the
statute is unconstitutional. As stated above, the State may not interfere with the
fundamental right to parent absent a compelling state interest and any interference must
be narrowly tailored. If two parents disagree about whether their child should be able to
accompany one parent on a trip to see the child's grandparents, for example, both
parents would be either violating or attempting to violate the other parent's custodial
rights. If the child goes on the trip, the parent who "takes" the child violates the
remaining parent's custodial rights; however, if the child stays, the remaining parent
"withholds" the child from the parent who wishes to visit their family. Under a broad
interpretation of the statute, the prosecutor would get to chose who to prosecute and
effectively make their own decision as to what is in the best interest of the child. Such
parenting disagreements no doubt arise on a daily basis; government intervention,
however, is neither warranted nor constitutionally permitted.
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restraining order regarding the child in CV -DR-2011-16503 and/or after
commencement of an action relating to child visitation or custody but prior
to the issuance of an order and where the defendant took the child out of
state and where the child has not voluntarily been returned unharmed to
Idaho.

(R, pp.29-30 (emphasis added).) Thus, the State was required to prove Ms. Calver did
some act (i.e., took and/or kept and/or withheld RC.), Ms. Calver did not have "lawful
authority" to do the alleged act, and the alleged act violated a custodial right of
Mr. Calver specifically established by the JTRO. The State failed to do so.
While there is ample evidence Ms. Calver took, kept, or withheld RC. from
Mr. Calver, there is no evidence she lacked lawful authority to do so.

The plain

language of the JTRO does not prohibit Ms. Calver from doing any of those actions.
The plain language does not establish Mr. Calver has any right to actual physical
custody of RC., let alone the right to personally visit with him.

At best, the JTRO

establishes that Ms. Calver's lawful authority to make decisions regarding R.C.'s
custody, care, and nurture, is limited by not allowing her to "remove" him from the State
of Idaho for more than 72 hours.

Simultaneously, this clause could be read to

establish Mr. Calver has an interest in RC. being somewhere in the State of Idaho for
periods up to 72 hours. However, the right to preclude the mother of your child from
taking your child outside of the State for more than 72 hours, does not establish a right
to have physical custody of the child.

Ms. Calver was not charged with taking Re.

outside of Idaho for more than 72 hours - she was charged with taking, keeping or
withholding RC. from Raymond Calver who has "joint custody or other parental rights
arising from" the JTRO.

15

The State simply failed to provide sufficient evidence to support Ms. Calver's
conviction for child custody interference. As such, this Court must vacate Ms. Calver's
conviction and order the district court to enter a Judgment of Acquittal.

II.
Ms. Calver's Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated By The District Court
Erroneously Instructing The Jury On The Findings Of Facts Necessary To Support A
Guilty Verdict

A

Introduction
Should this Court find there was sufficient evidence to sustain Ms. Calver's

conviction, it nevertheless must vacate her conviction. The jury instructions erroneously
informed the jury they could find Ms. Calver guilty if they found she "kept and/or
withheld" R.C. from Raymond Calver, as an alternative to finding she "took" R.C. from
Mr. Calver. As such, the jury was falsely instructed they could find Ms. Calver guilty if
they found that she engaged in conduct she had the lawful authority to engage in.
B.

Ms. Calver's Claim That The Jury Instructions Erroneously Allowed The Jury To
Convict Her If They Found She Engaged In Lawful Conduct Is Reviewable Under
The Fundamental Error Doctrine
Jury Instructions are reviewed as a whole to determine whether they adequately

and correctly convey to the jury the law that applies in the case. Chapman v. Chapman,
147 Idaho 756 (2009).

Ms. Calver did not object to the jury instructions. Ordinarily,

issues not preserved by timely objection or motion in the district court cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). However, where an
error has occurred at trial and was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, such
error may be reviewed where the defendant demonstrates to an appellate court that one
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of his unwaived constitutional rights was plainly violated. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Idaho
appellate courts review claims of fundamental error under the following analysis:
If the alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous
objection, it shall only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho's
fundamental error doctrine. Such review includes a three-prong inquiry
wherein the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court
that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and
(3) was not harmless. If the defendant persuades the appellate court that
the complained of error satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the
appellate court shall vacate and remand.
Id. at 228. As will be demonstrated below, Ms. Calver's claim is ripe for review under
the fundamental error doctrine.
C.

The Jury Instructions Erroneously Allowed The Jury To Convict Ms. Calver If
They Found She Engaged In Lawful Conduct
To the extent the JTRO established the Mr. Calver had a "parental right" to have

R.C. somewhere in the State of Idaho except for periods of less than 72 hours, in order
to find Ms. Calver guilty of interfering with this right, the jury must have been instructed
that Ms. Calver, after receiving notice of the JTRO, "removed" R.C. from Idaho for more
than 72 hours.

The elements jury instruction failed to instruct the jury; in fact, the

elements instruction required the jury to convict Ms. Calver if they found she engaged in
other conduct not specifically prohibited by the JTRO, and which is constitutionally
protected.
Jury Instruction 10 reads as follows:
In order for the defendant, Veronica L. Calver, to be guilty of Child
Custody Interference, the state must prove each of the following:
1. On or between September 8, 2011 and October 10, 2011
2. the defendant, Veronica L. Calver, intentionally
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3. and without lawful authority
4. took and/or kept and/or withheld
5. a child under the age of 18 years,
6. from Raymond Calver who had the right to custody and/or other
parental rights arising from a temporary restraining order regarding the
child in CV-DR-2011-16503,

7. where the defendant, with knowledge of the order, took the child out of
state and/or did not voluntarily return the child unharmed.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant guilty.
The "right to custody" includes custody, joint custody, visitation, or
other parental rights, whether such rights arise from a temporary or
permanent custody order or from the equal custodial rights of each parent
in the absence of a custody order.12
It is not "without lawful authority" to take and/or keep and/or
withhold a child if such action is taken to protect the child from imminent
physical harm and/or such an action is taken by a parent fleeing from
imminent physical harm to such parent.
(R., p.80.)

Although the instruction mimics the provisions of I.e. § 18-4506, the

custodial interference statute Ms. Calver was alleged to have violated, whether read in
isolation or in light of all of the jury instructions, because the jury was not provided a
correct definition of "lawful authority" the jury was required to convict Ms. Calver if it
found she engaged in the lawful conduct.
As argued above, Ms. Calver had the "lawful authority" to take R.C. to
Tennessee to start a new life, absent a specific court order.

(See section I, supra)

Although the jury was required to find Ms. Calver "was without lawful authority," the jury

12 This clause is the subject of Ms. Calver's alternative argument that the jury
instructions contained a fatal variance, which is argued in section III of this brief below.
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instruction did not correctly explain the meaning of that term.

The instructions are

devoid of any explanation a mother has the lawful authority to make decisions regarding
the custody, care, and nurture of her child, unless there is a court order specifically
limiting her ability to do so, let alone an explanation that the four corners of the court
order itself is the only limitation of this "lawful authority." Indeed, the jury instructions
exacerbate this problem by explaining to the jury that "it is not 'without lawful authority'
to take and/or keep and/or withhold a child" if there is an imminent threat to the child or
the mother. Id. Although the jury instructions do not specifically state this was the only
limit to Ms. Calver's "lawful authority," the lack of any further definition of that term leads
inexorably to the conclusion the jury would understand that, under Idaho law, flight from
imminent physical is the only "lawful authority" Ms. Calver enjoyed.
Furthermore, while the jury instruction correctly explained that Mr. Calver's
custodial or other parental rights could be established by the JTRO, it did not explain
that Ms. Calver's "lawful authority" was similarly limited thereby. (R., p.SO.) The JTRO
speCifically explained both parties were prohibited from "removing any minor child of the
parties who reside in Idaho from the State of Idaho (except for periods of time not
exceeding 72 hours)." (Exh. 1.) This is the only limit on Ms. Calver's fundamental right
to parent. Thus, the instructions should have required the jury to find that Ms. Calver
violated the specific terms of the JTRO, not that she engaged in any other conduct not
specifically prohibited by the order.
Had Ms. Calver been alleged to have committed criminal contempt of court for
violating the JTRO and be subject to the potential five days in jail and $5,000.00 fine
specifically warned of in the JTRO itself, the court would have had to find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that she violated the specific terms of the order. See Rice, supra.
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The court would first have to find that Ms. Calver had actual notice of the JTRO before
she left Idaho, as the entire JTRO did not become binding on the parties until each had
actual notice.

(Exh. 1.) Next, the court would have had to find that Ms. Calver then

"willfully" violated the order by removing R.C. from Idaho for more than 72 hours. See

Rice, supra. There is simply no requirement in the JTRO that if the child is removed
prior to notice of the JTRO, the child must be returned to Idaho. It does not matter what
the Magistrate meant by the order - Ms. Calver's fundamental right to parent was
limited by the order, not by what the Magistrate meant to include in the order.

13

(Exh.

1.)
Additionally, assuming but not conceding that the jury could find that Ms. Calver
violated Mr. Calver's parental right by "taking" R.C. from Mr. Calver (rather than from the
State of Idaho), the instruction requiring a guilty verdict if the jury found she "kept and/or
withheld" R.C. from Mr. Calver (or from the State of Idaho for that matter), is an
incorrect statement of law. As such, the jury instructions erroneously informed the jury
that they must find Ms. Calver guilty if they found she engaged in what is in reality,
lawful conduct.

Although the State may argue the "removal" clause should be read to have required
Ms. Calver to "return" R.C. to Idaho within 72 hours upon actual notice of the order,
assuming she was not aware of the clause prior to leaving the State, such an argument
would be unavailing. Although this is a "possible" interpretation of the JTRO, as the
JTRO is devoid of any plain language requiring return upon notice, it is not the only
"reasonable" interpretation See Rice, supra. The "judges of the domestic relations
court of Ada County" have apparently chosen to automatically enter non-specific orders
upon the filing of a complaint for divorce, without regard to the specific circumstances in
any given case. Prosecutors and Deputy Attorneys General are not given free rein to
interpret those orders as they please in order to support their desire to prosecute.
Rather than attempt to fit the proverbial square peg into the proverbial round hole, either
law enforcement or the Ada County prosecutor's office should have informed Mr. Calver
that the Magistrate Court must provide a specific custody order requiring Mr. Calver to
return R.C. to the State of Idaho, and to remove R.C. from Ms. Calver's lawful custody
13

into his own, if that was his desire.
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1.

The Erroneous Jury Instructions Violate One Or More Of Ms. Calver's
Unwaived Constitutional Rights

In addition to the well-established law that the right to parent is a substantive due
process right, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment as articulated in section I supra,
where a defendant charged with a crime pleads not guilty and takes his or her case to
trial, the defendant is exercising his or her rights to due process of law and to a jury trial,
requiring the State to prove every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged, to a
jury, beyond a reasonable doubt.

See U.S CONST. amds V, VI, XIV; see also In re

Winship 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978); Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993); Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1, 12 (1999); Middleton v.
McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004). Thus, where jury instructions fail to require the jury

to find every element of the crime charged, beyond a reasonable doubt, these unwaived
constitutional rights are violated. Ms. Calver has established that one or more of her
unwaived constitutional rights were violated by the jury instructions given in this case.
2.

The Error Plainly Exists And There Is Nothing To Suggest That Defense
Counsel Engaged In "Sandbagging"

Admittedly, Ms. Calver raised a necessity defense at trial claiming she left for
Tennessee fearing for her safety and the safety of her children, and she did not object
to the jury instructions. However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that she did
so knowing the jury instructions were incorrect and that she could obtain appellate relief
on that basis. This Court does not need to go beyond the record in this case to search
for an indication as to whether defense counsel's failure to object to the jury instructions
was a strategy decision.
Whether the jury was properly instructed is a question of law upon which the
appellate Court exercises free review. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d
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700, 703 (2010) (citation omitted).

While the Court may consider the arguments of

counsel and a ruling by the district court in determining whether the jury was properly
instructed, these arguments and findings are not necessary for this Court to determine
whether the jury was properly instructed. An error in instructing the jury on the facts
necessary to constitute the crime will either plainly exist, or plainly won't exist.
The Perry Court expressed its concern that defense counsel, recognizing that an
error has occurred, will remain silent in the hopes of a jury acquittal while knowing that
the issue could be raised on appeal even absent an objection. Perry, 150 Idaho at 22426. (citations omitted). Thus, the Perry Court explained the "fundamental error" doctrine
in Idaho requires the defendant to bear the burden of persuasion, not only as to the
question of whether the error involves one or more of the defendant's unwaived
Constitutional rights, but to additionally show the error plainly exists without the need for
any additional information not in the appellate record, including whether the failure to
object was a tactical decision on the part of the defendant.

Id. at 226.

Where an

instruction on the facts necessary to constitute the crime alleged is at it issue, there is
simply no legitimate reason to believe defense counsel is making a tactical decision not
to object.
Defense counsel cannot legitimately consent to lower the State's burden of proof
by agreeing the State can convict a defendant of a crime based on conduct not
prohibited by law. As it is the defendant's right to require the State to prove each fact
necessary to support a conviction for the crime charged, defense counsel cannot waive
that right on behalf of the defendant. See In re Winship 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Taylor v.
Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993); Neder v.
U.S., 527 U.S. 1, 12 (1999); Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004).
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Furthermore, focusing merely on the defense attorney's possible "sandbagging"
ignores the role played by the prosecutor and the district court judge in properly
instructing the jury, If this Court were to assume defense counsel would knowingly fail
to object to jury instructions that lower the State's burden of proof, in order to raise the
jury instruction issue on appeal only if the defendant is convicted, such an assumption
should equally apply to the prosecutor and to the district court judge.

Unlike the

defendant's trial strategy, defense counsel has no greater insight into the law than the
prosecutor or the district court judge,

Thus, if this Court is to assume that defense

counsel knows the elements instruction do not accurately state what facts must be
found, but chooses to "sandbag" by not objecting to the instruction, the Court must also
assume the prosecutor knows the elements instruction misstates the law as well.

In

essence, the Court must presume the prosecutor is specifically seeking a conviction in
violation of a defendant's constitutional rights to due process and jury trial.

Such

conduct on the part of a prosecutor would likely constitute misconduct. See, e.g., State
v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769 (1993)14 (recognizing that a prosecutor may not
misrepresent the law or reasonable doubt burden during closing arguments.)

14 Although undersigned counsel is unaware of any published opinion wherein a court
found misconduct for a prosecutor requesting or failing to object to a jury instruction that
lowered the state's burden of proof, a prosecutor's duty to seek "justice" has been aptly
described as follows:
'The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute

with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
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Furthermore, if defense counsel is presumed to knowingly allow an incomplete
elements instruction to be given to the jury, in violation of the defendant's constitutional
rights, the district court must also be presumed to give the instruction knowing it is also
violating the defendant's constitutional rights. In a criminal case, the district court has a
duty to instruct the jury on "'all matters of law necessary for their information.'" Miller v.
State, 135 Idaho 261,267 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting I.C. § 19-2132 and State v. Mack,

132 Idaho 480,483 (Ct. App. 1999)). This includes instructions on "rules of law material
to the determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence." Id. (citing Mack, 132 Idaho
at 483, 974 P.2d at 1112).

"Such obligatory instructions include those necessary to

correctly inform the jury with respect to the nature and elements of the crime charged
and the essential legal principles applicable to the evidence that has been admitted."
Id. (citing State v. Beason, 95 Idaho 267, 275 (1973) and State v. Patterson, 60 Idaho

67,75-76 (1939)).
Applying the "sandbagging" assumption to the district court, necessarily requires
an assumption that the district court knowingly violated its sworn duty by lowering the
State's burden of proof to the detriment of the defendant's constitutional rights. Such an
assumption leads to the conclusion that the district court was "biased" against the
defendant.

A finding of "bias" on the part of the district court is a "structural error,"

affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, requiring automatic reversal.

duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.'
State v. Wilbanks, 95 Idaho 346, 353-54 (1973) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasis added)). Clearly a prosecutor specifically seeking a
conviction in violation of a defendant's basic rights to a fair trial would violate these
obligations.
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Perry, 150 Idaho at 927-28; see also.

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991);

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).

In reality, none of these assumptions have any basis in fact. A defense attorney
who knowingly allows his or her client to be convicted on less than what is required by
the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, is committing malpractice, not trial
strategy. A prosecutor who knowingly allows the jury to convict a defendant on less
than what is required by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, commits
misconduct by seeking foul blows, rather than justice. 15

A district court judge who

knowingly allows the jury to convict a defendant on less than what is required by the
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, is not fit for the bench. This Court should not
hold defense counsel to a higher standard and assume defense counsel is the only
member of the bar who knows the law but ignores its requirements, while at the same
time assume the prosecutor and the district court judge were unaware of the law,
especially when the ultimate question is whether the defendant's rights to due process
and a jury determination are at stake. The more realistic assumption is that defense
counsel, the prosecutor, and the district court all simply failed to understand the

15 To the extent this Court presumes that any of the members of the bar involved in this
trial was aware that the jury instructions falsely stated the elements that must be
proven, that presumption should be placed on the prosecutor who, not only failed to
object to the language informing the jury that Mr. Calver's parental rights could arise out
of the his "equal custodial rights" as R.C.'s father, an allegation not made in the
Information and the subject of section "I of this brief, but the who also argued, "Whether
you chose to like, believe, condone, embrace, disagree with anything Ray Calver did,
Ray had the right to have custody. He had the right to have Rodney in the State of
Idaho." (Tr.2/20/12, p.289, LsA-8.) Although the first sentence in this passage
indicates the prosecutor falsely believed the JTRO granted Mr. Calver the right to
custody of R.C., the second clause indicates the prosecutor may have been aware the
JTRO was a limit to Mr. Calver's custodial rights, and thus, also expressed the only
limitation on Ms. Calver's lawful authority. In any event, there is no indication in the
record that counsel for Ms. Calver was similarly aware the jury instructions must have

reflected the language contained in the JTRO, rather than the statute.
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importance of the JTRO in this case, and failed to recognize the right to parent is
fundamental and cannot be violated merely because State officials believe their way is
better.
Additionally, instructing the jury properly in this case would in no way derail
Ms. Calver's necessity defense. See State v. Sutton, 151 Idaho 161, 166-67 (Ct. App.
2011) (rejecting the State's speculation that defense counsel's failure to object to the
omission of a necessary element in the jury instructions was tactical,observing that,
although the defendant was pursuing an alibi defense, nothing precluded the alternative
argument that the State failed to prove the missing element).

In fact, the opposite is

true. Had the jury been instructed they must find Ms. Calver had actual notice of the
JTRO, willfully ignored its commands and took R.C. out of State and did not return him
within 72 hours, Ms. Calver could have presented a much more focused necessity
defense explaining her fear of imminent harm as it existed at the time she left the State.
Instead, the jury was required to find her guilty if they found that she either kept or
withheld R.C. from Mr. Calver. The jury, knowing the police had already intervened in
the matter, may have questioned her alleged need to "keep and/or withhold" R.C. from
Mr. Calver, believing that police intervention would prevent any harm. Failing to object
to the expansion of the alleged criminal conduct beyond the specific prohibitions
contained in the JTRO only undermined Ms. Calver's affirmative defense.

There is

simply nothing in the record to suggest that defense counsel knowingly undermined
Ms. Calver's defense by failing to object to these erroneous instructions, which errors
are plain on their face.

26

3.

The District Court's Erroneous Jury Instruction Was Not Harmless

Ms. Calver asserts this Court cannot find the error in this case to be harmless.
Under the test articulated in Perry for determining harmless error where there was not a
contemporaneous objection, Ms. Calver "bear[s] the burden of proving there is a
reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial." Perry, 150 Idaho
at 226.

There is undoubtedly a reasonable possibility that the error affected the

outcome of the trial.
First, it is indeed a rare occasion in which a guilty verdict could stand based upon
erroneous jury instructions as to the facts the jury must find in order to sustain a
conviction.

"The jury instruction must not permit the defendant to be convicted of

conduct that does not constitute the type of crime charged." State v. Folk, 151 Idaho
327, 342 (2011). As noted by the Perry Court (although admittedly in the context of a
jury instruction error which was timely objected to), "Where the jury reached its verdict
based upon erroneous instruction an appellate court shall generally vacate and remand
the decision of the lower court.,,16 Id. at 228. In the present case, it is simply impossible
to conclude the jury found Ms. Calver guilty based solely on her alleged violation of the
specific provisions of the JTRO, rather than by taking, keeping, or withholding R.C. from
Mr. Calver.
Furthermore, although Forrest Calver claimed he served Ms. Calver before she
left Idaho, he admitted that he was not sure of which papers he actually served her with.
(Tr.2/19/12, p.138, L.21

p.139, L.7; p.147, L.9-p.152, L.16; p.154, L.12-p.156, L.9.)

16 The Court noted that an exception to this rule applies where the jury instruction is
missing one element and, in such a situation, the test articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Neder v. US., 527 U.S. 1 (1999), applies. See Perry,150 Idaho at
228 citing State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73,39 (2004).)
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For her part, Ms. Calver testified Forrest merely came to her house, dropped the papers
at her feet, and told her she had been served, but she did not read the papers and was
told the service was improper.

(Tr.2/20/12, p.188, L.13 - p.194, L.18.)

It was

undisputed; however, that Ms. Calver was made aware of the "removal" clause, first by
Officer Olsen then by Detective Brumbaugh, after she had left Idaho, although the
officers erroneously told her the JTRO required her to return RC. to Idaho within 72.
In addition, during closing arguments, the prosecutor stressed to the jury the
State did not have to prove Ms. Calver merely "removed" RC. from Idaho, but that they
sustained their burden if then showed she "kept" or "withheld" RC. from Mr. Calver.
(Tr.2/20/12, p.264, LS.7-12 (prosecutor arguing "She took and kept or withheld the child"

and "She took Rodney to Tennessee without lawful authority.); p. 265, Ls.12-16
(prosecutor arguing Ms. Calver knew about the order because an officer told her about
it (which occurred after she left Idaho)); p.288, LS.15-21 (prosecutor arguing the "took
and/or kept and/or withheld" language shows that the State need prove only one of
those factors, not all three.)) The prosecutor's arguments, while not falling under the
category of misconduct assuming the prosecutor was not aware the jury instructions
were erroneous, is a recognition the jury could find Ms. Calver guilty for engaging in
conduct not prohibited by law.
In short, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury found Ms. Calver guilty of
keeping or withholding RC. from Raymond Calver, even though the JTRO contains no
language requiring Ms. Calver to allow Mr. Calver access to RC., and no language
requiring her to return R.C. to Idaho if she did not have actual notice of the "removal"
clause prior to leaving.

Therefore, the error is not harmless and this Court should

vacate Ms. Calver's conviction.
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III.
There Exists A Fatal Variance Between The Information And The Jury Instructions, As
The Jury Instructions Alleged Mr. Calver's Custodial Rights Could Arise Either From A
Custodial Order, As Alleged In The Information, Or From His Equal Custodial Right As
A Parent, Which Was Not Alleged In The Information

A.

Introduction
Ms. Calver asserts the jury instructions erroneously state Mr. Calver's custodial

or other parental rights arise either from the JTRO or his "equal custodial rights" as
R.C.'s father.

The Information, however, alleged Mr. Calver's custodial or parental

rights stem directly from the JTRO, not from anywhere else.

This additional "equal

custodial rights" language constitutes a fatal variance requiring this Court to vacate Ms.
Calver's conviction.
B.

The Issue Of Whether The Jury Instructions Contain A Fatal Variance Is Ripe For
Appellate Review
As stated above, Idaho Code § 18-4506 reads, in relevant part,
1 A person commits child custody interference if the person, whether a
parent or other, or agent of that person, intentionally and without lawful
authority:
(a) Takes, entices away, keeps or withholds any minor child from a parent
or another person or institution having custody, joint custody, visitation or
other parental rights, whether such rights arise from temporary or
permanent custody order, or from the equal custodial rights of each
parent in the absence of a custody order.

I.C. § 18-4506(1 )(a) (emphasis added).

Ms. Calver, however, was alleged to have

violated Mr. Calver's custodial or other parental rights specifically arising from the
JTRO.
That the Defendant, VERONICA L CALVER AKA HANEY, on or
th
between the 8 day of September, 2011 and the 10th day of October,
2011, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did intentionally and without
lawful authority, take and/or keep and/or withhold, a minor child, R. C., a

child of the age of two (2), from Raymond Calver and who has joint
custody

and/or

other

parental
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rights

arising

from

temporary

restraining order regarding the child in CV -OR-2011-16503 and/or after
commencement of an action relating to child visitation or custody but prior
to the issuance of an order and where the defendant took the child out of
state and where the child has not voluntarily been returned unharmed to
Idaho.
(R., pp.29-30.)17 Thus, the State failed to allege that Mr. Calver's custodial or parental
rights arose from his "equal custodial rights" as R.C.'s father. 18

However, Jury

Instruction 10 informs the jury that, "The 'right to custody' includes custody, joint
custody, visitation, or other parental rights, whether such rights arise from a temporary
or permanent custody order or from the equal custodial rights of each parent in the
absence of a custody order." (R., p.80.) While this language mimics the language in
the statute, it alleges a means by which Ms. Calver can be found guilty other than
alleged in the Information
Although the inclusion of the "equal custodial rights" language was not objected
to, the issue is ripe for review under the Perry standard. As stated in section II(c)(1)
above, any time a jury instruction lowers the State's burden of proof, a defendant's
unwaived constitutional rights are violated. In addition, a variance between a charging

17 The language stating "and/or after commencement of an action relating to child
visitation or custody but prior to the issuance of an order and where the defendant took
the child out of state and where the child has not voluntarily been returned unharmed to
Idaho" is not synonymous with custodial rights which arise from the "equal custodial
rights of parents." Rather, that language refers to subsection 1(b) of I.C. § 18-4506
which describes a separate means by which the defendant's actions are prohibited, not
a separate means from which the alleged victim's custodial rights arose. See I.C. § 184506( 1)(b).
18 Although the record is devoid of the reason why the State chose not to allege the
"equal custodial rights" language in the Information, it is quite possible that the
prosecutor read this clause as only applying when the alleged perpetrator is not the
other parent, as charging one parent who indeed enjoys "equal custodial rights" with
violating the other parent's "equal custodial rights" is the epitome of the State interfering
with the charged parent's fundamental right to parent with no showing of a compelling
State interest. The State does not get to pick the winner in family squabbles about how
best to raise a child, absent a specific order from a court.
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document and a jury instruction may deprive a defendant of his or her Fourteenth
Amendment right to notice of the charge they must defend against.
United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).

See Berger v.

Thus, a variance claim presents a constitutional

question and Perry's first prong is satisfied.

Additionally, for the same reasons

articulated in section II(c)(2) above, Ms. Calver asserts the error is plain on its face, and
there is no reason to believe that Ms. Calver engaged in "sandbagging" or had any
greater insight into the law than the prosecutor or the district court. Finally, for reasons
more fully articulated below, Ms. Calver maintains that the variance was fatal, and thus
not harmless.
C.

The Variance Was Fatal Requiring This Court To Vacate Ms. Calver's Conviction
In addition to the reasons articulated in section II(c)(3) above, Ms. Calver asserts

that the variance in this case is fatal; thus, by definition, the error is not harmless. A
variance between the charging document and the verdict is fatal when 'the record
suggests the possibility that the defendant was misled or embarrassed in the
preparation or presentation of his defense.'"

State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 972

(2008) (quoting State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 418 (1985), in turn citing Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82-84 (1935).) "The instructions to the jury must match the

allegation in the charging document as to the means by which a defendant is alleged to
have committed the crime charged." State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 342 (2011) (citing
State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 147 (2007).) ''The jury instruction must not permit the

defendant to be convicted of conduct that does not constitute the type of crime
charged." Id.
In Folk, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the defendant's conviction for lewd
conduct upon finding the jury was erroneously instructed they could find the defendant
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guilty, if they found he engaged in conduct other than oral to genital contact as alleged
in the Information. Id. at 339-342. The Court reasoned because the State presented
evidence the defendant was seen by the child's mother kneeling down in front of the
child with the child's legs around him, but he was not seen actually performing oral to
genital contact on the child, the jury could have believed the defendant's claim that he
was merely tickling the child, but still find him guilty based on the erroneous jury
instruction defining the specific statutory means by which lewd conduct can be
perpetrated, but adding the term "et cetera." Id. at 342. The Court held, "This type of
physical contact would not constitute the crime of lewd conduct, although it may have
constituted attempted lewd conduct had the jury been so instructed." Id.
Although the present case differs from Folk in two key aspects, these differences
are without a distinction when it comes to a determination of whether the variance in this
case was fatal

First, the "et cetera" language that resulted in the variance in Folk was

objected to by defense counsel. Id. at 340. However, a variance in the jury instructions
is ripe for appellate review because an erroneous instruction on the facts the State must
prove in order to sustain a conviction effects a defendant's constitutional rights and will
plainly exist, with the only remaining determination being whether the error is fatal or
harmless.

Second, although the Folk Court recognized the defendant in could have

been convicted for conduct not constituting a crime, and the "equally custodial rights"
language is indeed included in the statute Ms. Calver was charged with violating, "[I]t is
axiomatic that a conviction upon a charge not made or upon a charge not tried
constitutes a denial of due process." Jackson v. Virginia, 433 U.S. 307, 314 (1979)
(citations omitted). Due process requires the State to try the defendant for committing a
crime by means actually alleged, not by alternative means the State failed to allege.
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The variance in this case is fatal because it allowed the jury to convict Ms. Calver
of committing custodial interference if the jury found that Mr. Calver enjoyed custodial or
other parental rights stemming either from the JTRO, or from his natural rights as a
father. In essence, the State was merely required to prove that Mr. Calver was R.C.'s
father, a fact not disputed by the parties, in order to find that he had a custodial right
that Ms. Calver violated, rather than being required to prove she violated the specific
custodial or parental rights contained in the JTRO. The jury could reasonably conclude
Ms. Calver violated the statute by taking, keeping, or withholding R.C. from Mr. Calver
upon his demand that she not leave for Tennessee. Such conduct was not alleged in
the Information and the variance was fatal requiring this Court to vacate Ms. Calver's
conviction.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Calver respectfully requests that this Court vacate her conviction and instruct
the district court to enter a judgment of acquittal. Alternatively, she respectfully requests
that this Court vacate her conviction and remand her case to the district court for a new
trial
DATED this 21 st day of August, 2012.
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